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I. INTRODUCTION
Baseball has been played in this country for almost 130 years, growing
from a simple game played mostly for exercise and recreation into a
multi-million dollar business and the national past time.' Yet it has only
been in the last decade that professional baseball players have earned
annual salaries in excess of one million dollars.2 Back-up and role players3
typically sign long-term contracts guaranteeing millions of dollars. To
place this phenomenon into perspective, in 1975, Andy Messersmith, a
highly talented and sought-after pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers
was dissatisfied with his salary of appoximately $115,000.! In 1986,
Mike Schmidt, the All-Star third baseman of the Philadelphia Phillies,
earned $2,127,333.1 The price for a coveted ballplayer has increased
twenty-fold in little over a decade. Average player salaries demonstrate
a similar increase. In 1975, the average player's annual salary was
$44,676. In 1986, it had increased to $412,550.6
1. According to The Sporting News's "1987 Official Baseball Guide," 47,506,203 fans
attended major league baseball games in 1986.
2. In the winter of 1986-87 alone, eight players submitted annual salary demands of
more than one million dollars during salary arbitration. The eight players were: Wade
Boggs of the Red Sox, Jack Morris of the Tigers, Don Mattingly of the Yankees, Jesse
Barfield and George Bell of the Blue Jays, Orel Hershiser of the Dodgers, and Ron
Darling and Dwight Gooden of the Mets. This figure does not include such notable free
agents as Tim Raines, Andre Dawson, and Rich Gedman who had not signed contracts
with anyone by opening day and so did not participate in arbitration. Nor does it include
spring training holdouts like Roger Clemens who are not eligible for arbitration or free
agency. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
3. These are players who do not play for the team on a daily, game-to-game basis,
but instead fill certain part-time roles: e.g., defensive replacement, pinch-hitter, or long
relief-spot starter. See Baseball Salaries '87, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 20, 1987, at
54.
4. Sobel, The Emancipation of Professional Athleies, 3 W. ST. U.L. REv. 185, 205
(1976). See also Newhan, Messersmith Still Stalled, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, (Sports),
at 1, col. 2. Messersmith played the entire 1975 season without signing a new contract,
because the Dodgers refused to include either a no-trade clause or a clause giving him
the right to approve any trade involving him.
5. Bodley, Mattingly Gets Record: Arbitrator Sides With Yankee for $1.975 M, USA
Today, Feb. 2, 1987, at Cl, col. 3. Accompanying this article is a chart showing the top
five 1987 player salaries. They are:
Mike Schmidt, 3B, Philadelphia, $2,127,333
Jim Rice, OF, Boston $2,109,195
George Brett, 3B, Kansas City $2,105,000
Eddie Murray, IB, Baltimore $2,044,757
Don Mattingly, IB, New York Yankees $1,975,000
6. Macnow, Messersmith, McNally: They Had No Idea...., The Sporting News, Feb.
9, 1987, at 33, col. 2.
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What is the cause of this dramatic shift in economic worth of the
ballplayer? One prominent factor may be the advent of a more structured
and equal bargaining process between players and management. It is
the purpose of this note to examine baseball's salary dispute resolution
process and its relation to this meteoric rise in salaries paid to professional
baseball players, as well as its effect on the game.
II. HISTORY
Although Abner Doubleday is traditionally credited with inventing
the game, two conventions in 1857 and 1858 established the first uniform
set of rules. At first, baseball was played on a strictly amateur basis,
but professionalism inevitably crept into the sport.7 Professionalism be-
came a "foregone conclusion" when, in 1868, Cincinnati assembled the
first all-professional team, losing only one game in two years.8 Other
teams in the league quickly realized that only by hiring a team of
professional players could they remain competetive. By 1871, the Na-
tional Association of Baseball Players was created, consisting of nine
teams with a regular schedule.9 This organization became the National
League of Baseball Clubs in 1875,11 the forerunner of today's National
League. From then on, the game has been played professionally, and
in a relatively organized manner.
Just a few years after the new league formed, it encountered two
problems that still exist today. These problems and their solutions played
a major role in shaping the modem game. The emergence of free agency
and the salary arbitration process are the progeny of the heavy-handed
manner in which baseball management dealt with these initial problems.
The first problem was player discipline. In 1877, four players charged
with throwing games were banned from the game for life." The pun-
ishment for this violation is not as important as the manner in which
it was determined. The league unilaterally decided the punishment with
no resort to the courts. 2 This established a precedent; the league governed
itself, "keeping its own house clean" without outside interference. This
idea that the league should govern itself remained strong for decades,
and remains part of managements' governing philosophy today. In 1946,
an observer noted: "Baseball depends almost entirely on its own powers
7. Note, Baseball and the Law - Yesterday and Today, 32 VA. L. REv. 1164, 1165
(1946). See also Moreland, BalIdom & Strayton, Baseball Jurisprudence, 44 AM. L. REv.
374 (1910).
8. Note, supra note 7, at 1165 n.9. The annual wages for players on this first professional
team ranged from $800 to $1,400.
9. Id. at 1165.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
244
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in settling its problems. Through the years organized baseball has had
to handle its own difficulties with very little assistance from the courts;
and it has been able to do this only because of its tight-knit monopolistic
structure which makes exclusion of dissenters the means of enforcing
its decisions and edicts."' 3 This policy of tight self-regulation was a
major contributor to the comparatively low salaries paid to major league
ballplayers until the 1970's.14
The second problem the new league faced was personified in "Orator
Jim" O'Rourke.5 In 1879, O'Rourke became upset when his team, the
'Boston Beaneaters, would not buy him a uniform. His solution was
simply to quit the Boston team and sign on with the Providence team.6
In response to O'Rourke's actions, the owners of the major league teams
met secretly that year and devised the infamous "reserve system" in
an effort to combat this problem of players "jumping" from team to
team." The idea was simple and effective. Initially, the reserve system
was a gentleman's agreement between the owners that each owner could
produce a list of players "off-limits" to the rest of the league." These
players were "reserved" to one team only, and the owners agreed not
to lure away or contract with a player reserved to another team. A few
years later, this system was formalized and a "reserve clause" was
written into the contracts of all major and minor league players. 9
13. Id. at 1164.
14. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
15. Jim O'Rourke played from 1876 to 1893 for, among others, Boston, Providence,
and Buffalo as a player-manager. During his career he played in 1,774 games, and collected
2,304 hits compiling a .310 career batting average. In 1877, he led the league in runs
scored, and three years later he led the league in homeruns with a grand total of six.
O'Rourke is now a member of baseball's Hall of Fame. See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA
1216 (J. Reichler 5th ed. 1982).
16. Boswell & McKeown, Baseball-From Trial by Law to Trial by Auction, 4 J.
CONTEMP. L. 171 (1978). Interestingly, he played only one season for Providence. After
the 1879 season, he returned to Boston for one year before moving on to Buffalo.
17. Id. at 173.
18. Id. At first the number of players reserved for each team was kept low. The
original agreement allowed a team to reserve only five players.
19. The reserve clause is a mandatory provision of the Uniform Players' Contract.
Section 10(a) of the 1973-75 contract which affected Andy Messersmith stated:
On or before December 20 (or if a Sunday then the next preceding business
day) in the year of the last playing season covered by this contract, the Club may
tender to the Player a contract for the term of that year by mailing the same to
the Player at his address following his signature hereto, or if none be given, then
at his last address of record with the Club. If prior to the March 1 next succeeding
said December 20, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of
such contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have
the right by written notice to the Player at said address to renew this contract for
the period of one year on the same terms, except that the amount payable to the
Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said notice; provided, however, that
such amount, if fixed by a Major League Club, shall be an amount payable at a
rate not less than 80% of the rate stipulated for the next preceding year and at
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The effect of the reserve clause was that a team would have exclusive
rights to a player's services for the year succeeding the contract year.
In essence, a ballplayer signing a contract containing a reserve clause
(and all of them had it), was bound to that team for life. If, at the
end of the contract's term, the player, for whatever reason, had a dispute
with his employer, he was not free to seek employment in baseball
elsewhere. The reserve clause bound that player to one team not only
for the term of the contract, but for the succeeding season as well. The
player's only choices were to accept the offer made by the owner, hope
for a trade, or find employment outside of baseball. The owners had
the power to make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to any player under
contract, and any player attempting to sit out a year to gain "free
agency" status found himself blacklisted and unable to play anywhere
in the National League.'0
The reserve system was roundly criticized by most players who likened
it to a system of slavery. John Montgomery Ward, a player who put
himself through law school with the money he made playing, labelled
the clause "a fugitive slave law... which denied [a ballplayer] a harbor
or a livelihood and carried him back, bound and shackled, from (sic)
the club from which he attempted to escape."'" It was, however, the
owner's most effective solution to a dilemma as old as the game itself:
"[O]n the one hand there is the desirableness, bordering on necessity,
of being able to retain players as long as they are needed by the team,
and on the other the financial necessity of being able to release them
when they are no longer of value."" The reserve system accomplished
this goal admirably; owners indentured players indefinitely, while re-
taining the power to release the player with only ten days' notice. This
system created legal concerns regarding the mutuality of the contract's
obligations, but suprisingly, this issue was never successfully pursued in
court.'
a rate not less than 70% of the rate stipulated for the year immediately prior to
the next preceding year.
Uniform Players' Contract, Section 10(a), 1973-1975. See Note, Arbitration of Professional
Athletes' Contracts: An Effective System of Dispute Resolution in Professional Sports,
55 NEB. L. REV. 362, 371 n.40 (1976).
20. Martin, The Aftermath of Flood v. Kuhn: Professional Baseball's Exemption
from Antitrust Regulations, 3 W. ST. U.L. REV. 262, 266 (1976).
21. Boswell & McKeown, supra note 16, at 174.
22. Note, supra note 7, at 1168.
23. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. 57 (1890). Hallman sold
his services for life to the Philadelphia Ball Club for $1,400 per annum. Yet, according
to the contract, Hallman had no hold on the Ball Club for any period longer than ten
days. The County Court of Philadelphia noted that "such a contract is so wanting in
mutuality that no court of equity would lend its aid to compel compliance with it." Id.
at 63. But see Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (1865); American Ass'n Baseball Club of
Kansas City v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. 232 (1890), where the courts, while not compelling the
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Although the reserve system was disliked by the players, no one
doubted its effectiveness at solving the dilemma of player control. Even
John Montgomery Ward, who spoke out so vehemently against the evils
of the system, was forced to acknowledge the stability it infused into
the game's management: "The reserve rule on the whole, is a bad one;
but it cannot be rectified save by injuring the interests of the men who
invest their money. ' 24 Therefore, from its clandestine beginnings in 1879,
the reserve system grew to be an integral part of baseball in only a
few short years. The system, though hated by the players, gained strength
when met with approval by the federal judiciary.2
These two management principles, tight institutional control and the
reserve clause, gave baseball owners monopolistic power to run the game
as they saw fit. They possessed absolute authority to dictate the terms
and conditions of player's employment, and the power to deal harshly
with those who tried to change the system.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES
As can be expected, players often chaffed under these conditions,
yet the courts were not at all receptive to the concept of "ballplayers
in bondage." In 1931, the absolute power of the Commissioner of Baseball
to control the game's internal affairs was upheld in federal court.2 On
three separate occasions, the United States Supreme Court was called
on to rule on the legality of the reserve clause. Each time, the Court
looked the other way, despite the clause's obvious antitrust implications.
The first reserve clause challenge came in 1922 in the case of Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs." In this case, the reserve clause was challenged by a rival league
which was attempting to lure star players away from the established
National League. In his brief to the Court, National League counsel
George Wharton Pepper laid out the team owners' arguments in defense
of the reserve clause:
From the point of view of the club, the reserve clause is absolutely necessary, for
otherwise a skillfull player developed at the expense of one club would be snapped
up by another and the clubs would always be engaged in a competition for players.
Experience shows the disastrous results to the sporting public, to the clubs and to
the players, which have always ensued at times when reservations have not been
respected and there was unrestrained bidding for players.'
player to play with his club, nevertheless enjoined him from playing for another team
during the time covered by the contract.
24. Boswell & McKeown, supra note 16, at 174.
25. See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
26. Milwaukee American Ass'n Baseball Club v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Il. 1931).
27. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
28. See Brief on behalf of the Defendants-in-Error at 71-72, Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
See also Boswell & McKeown, supra note 16, at 176.
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The Supreme Court accepted the argument. Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, held further that the reserve clause did not
violate the antitrust laws because baseball itself was not a business
engaging in interstate commerce.
The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state affairs. It is
true that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they
have achieved, competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities
and states. But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the League must
induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing
so is not enough to change the character of the business."
The second challenge to the system was offered by a minor league
player in the New York Yankees organization, Earl Toolson. Toolson
objected to being assigned to different locations within the Yankee farm
system30 at management's whim. Others believe Toolson realized the
Yankees were a talent-laden club and simply wanted out of the system
so he would have a better chance of making a major league roster."
The league relied heavily on Federal Baseball in its second defense of
the reserve clause before the Supreme Court:
It would probably be an overstatement to assert that if the Federal Baseball case
were reversed there would be no more professional baseball. But certainly the
present organization which has brought the sport to its present great popularity
could not continue. The uncertainty which would undoubtedly prevail, before any
remedial legislation could be enacted as to the extent of the control baseball clubs
and leagues could exercise over their players to insure the integrity of the game
and adequate talent to each club in a league so as to keep the teams evenly
balanced would undoubtedly result in the wrecking of the present organization of
the game. This obviously would not be of any benefit to the players or the public."
Again, the Court accepted the owners' argument and affirmed Federal
Baseball.33
The third and final challenge to the reserve system came in 1972 in
29. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
30. The farm system is a series of minor league baseball teams affiliated with every
major league team. These teams are arranged by skill levels. Currently there are four
such levels: Rookie, A, AA, and AAA. The least experienced players begin with the
Rookie league team, and move their way up the chain as they refine their skills and
abilities.
Toolson's status as a member of a minor league club was not unusual. Almost all
players spend at least some time in the minor leagues gaining experience and closely
supervised coaching before playing at the major league level. See also Boswell & McKeown,
supra note 16, at 177.
31. Boswell & McKeown, supra note 16, at 177.
32. Brief for Respondents at 66-67, Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953).
33. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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Flood v. Kuhn.m In that case, Cardinal outfielder Curt Flood was traded
to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood refused to report to the Phillies,
instead claiming the right to sit out for a year and then sign on with
any team in the League. In the meantime, he filed an antitrust action
against baseball management. 5
Flood had good reason to believe that a suit against the League
would result in a finding that the reserve clause was violative of antitrust
laws. Since Toolson, the Court had held that other forms of entertain-
ment did not warrant a special exemption from antitrust laws, including
theater,36 boxing,37 and professional football." The Court's movement in
this direction indicated that the antitrust exemption granted to baseball
as early as Federal Baseball would be overturned.
In Flood, team owners made their usual pleas to the Court, claiming
that the reserve clause was necessary to: (1) maintain balanced com-
petition; (2) preserve the game's integrity and public confidence; (3)
protect and provide incentive for Baseball's extraordinarily high player
development costs; and (4) maintain the benefits which the reserve
clause had brought with respect to economic stability. 9 The Supreme
Court suprisingly agreed with management's arguments and for the third
time in fifty years ruled that baseball was exempt from the restrictions
of the antitrust laws. In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun rec-
ognized that this position was rather inconsistent with its rulings re-
garding other forms of entertainment, but he solved the contradiction
in this manner:
If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic
of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court .....
Under these circumstances, there is merit in consistency even though some might
claim that beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsistency. °
The Court, then, had for the third time denied a judicial remedy to
ballplayers seeking relief from the burden of the reserve clause. Since
the judicial remedies seemed to be exhausted, it was not suprising that
ballplayers would turn to a non-judicial resolution of their problem. That
resolution was arbitration.
34. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
35. Id. at 264-66.
36. United States v. Schubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
37. United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
38. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
39. Brief for Respondents at 6-12, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
40. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 258, 284 (1972).
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IV. FREE AGENCY - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE RESERVE CLAUSE
In 1975, arbitrator Peter Seitz issued a ruling in the Messersmith-
McNally case that changed the character of baseball forever.4' Two
pitchers, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally, challenged the reserve
system, claiming that since they had refused to sign contracts for the
1975 baseball season, they were free to sign with anyone they wished.
Messersmith was under contract for the 1974 season with the Los
Angeles Dodgers, but could not reach an agreement with Dodger man-
agement for the following season.42 The Dodgers, invoking the reserve
clause, held Messersmith for the 1975 season, even though he did not
sign a contract. They granted him a small pay increase for that year,
but refused to offer a no-trade clause or a "right of refusal of any
trade" clause. Since these provisions were not offered, Messersmith
refused to sign, but he did play the following season. At the end of
that season, Messersmith and the Dodgers had still not reached an
agreement, and Messersmith claimed the right to become a free agent.
Since he had played out his "option year" with the Dodgers without
signing a contract, he claimed the club no longer had any contractual
control over his services. The Dodgers, however, claimed that when
Messersmith refused to sign in the spring of 1975, they simply renewed
his contract with a slight salary increase, as was their right under the
terms of the 1974 contract.43 Among the clauses in this new contract
for 1975 was another reserve clause, binding Messersmith to the club
for the 1976 season, despite the fact that he had signed nothing since
the spring of 1974. Under this argument, the Dodgers could control the
rights to Messersmith's services ad infinitum.44
Arbitrator Seitz held that because of "careless wording" in the
contract between management and players, the reserve clause did not
really mean what most players thought it meant.45 He ruled that a
player could become a free agent by giving notice to his team one year
before his contractual obligations expired, that Messersmith was free
to put himself up for auction to the highest bidder.4' On the open
market, Messersmith's immediate value was 1.5 million dollars.47 Seitz,
of course, was fired by baseball owners within hours of making this
decision,48 and thus the era of baseball free agency began.
As players gained the right to become free agents, baseball man-
41. In re Professional Baseball Clubs, 662 Ab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.),
42. See Newhan, supra note 4.
43. See Sobel, supra note 4, at 205-11.
44. Id.
45. Boswell & McKeown, supra note 16, at 172.
46. Macnow, supra note 6.
47. Id.
48. Boswell & McKeown, supra note 16, at 172.
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agement predicted the worst. They feared that quality players would
gravitate to better teams, and the league would polarize into the "haves"
and the "have nots. '49 Surprisingly the opposite occured. Rather than
the established teams grabbing up the star players from the weaker
teams, the weaker teams began offering large salaries in an effort to
lure accomplished players away from the contenders. Free agents, it
seemed, were more highly sought after by teams coming off poor
seasons."' Stronger teams, on the other hand, did not see the need to
participate in the free agent markets 2 This resulted in star players
moving toward the struggling teams.
This movement was both unexpected by management and beneficial
to the game. Baseball, as any other organized sport, does not operate
on a laissez-faire marketplace system. The object of the various teams
is not to put the others out of business. Instead, baseball operates on
the theory that the League is only as strong as its weakest team.
Therefore, the migration of talent to the weaker "links of the chain"
actually strengthened the League as a whole by making every team
more competitive. In this respect, free agency is a boon to the League,
especially to its weaker members.
From the team owners' vantage point, the free agency system also
had a disastrous side effect which they had predicted. This effect is
described by former Baltimore Orioles General Manager Hank Peters
as "The Law of Increasing Desperation.'" 3 Simply put, increasing des-
peration is the fear that strikes the rest of the League when one team
signs a quality free agent. The other teams realize that one of their
competitors has just strengthened itself, while they have done nothing.
The previously idle teams begin to panic, and they jump into the free
agent market in an attempt to keep pace with their rivals. The result
is that the price for the remaining free agents escalates according to
the law of supply and demand instead of in relation to the player's
talent and usefulness. This desperation is fueled by the press and fan
anticipation. The fans of every team want to see their team improve
49. Id. at 181. This idea that free agency would ruin league balance was called the
"Crushing Dynasty" theory.
50. Id. In 1976, the first official "free agent" year, the first ten "million dollar" free
agents all went to teams with worse records than those they left.
51. Harry Daulton, Milwaukee Brewers' General Manager, noted that "losing teams
know these free agents are like a vein of gold in the ground. . . . Unless your team is
an absolute economic disaster, you're going to take the risk and go prospecting." Id. at
183.
52. Economists Roger Noll and Benjamin Okner of the Brookings Institute testified
before a Senate Antitrust Subcommittee in 1971 that all things being equal, a good player
is worth more to a talent-poor team than to a talent-rich one. Id.
53. Quoted in id.
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over the off-season, especially if a rival team has signed a "big-name"
player.
The "Law of Increasing Desperation" was repealed in 1985. In that
year, owners for the first time exercised what has been called, alter-
natively, financial restraint,' fiscal sanity,55 or collusion. 6 The result was
an abrupt halt in "the spirited bidding for players,'5 7 and a grievance
filed by the Players Association. On September 21, 1987, arbitrator
Thomas T. Roberts ruled that baseball club owners did in fact act in
concert to block the movement of free agents." To support his finding
of collusion, Roberts cited a memorandum distributed in October of
1985 by then-Director of the Player Relations Committee, Leland S.
MacPhail, to baseball's general managers. That memorandum urged
team owners to avoid long-term contracts because players signed to such
contracts "frequently do not thereafter perform to the level of their
ability or suffer injuries that force them to leave baseball while still
enjoying the salary benefits of the contracts."" MacPhail went on to
declare: "We must stop daydreaming that one free agent signing will
bring a pennant. Somehow we must get our operation back to the point
where a normal year for the average team results in a break-even
situation, so that the Clubs are not led to make rash moves in the vain
hope that they might bring a pennant and a resulting change in their
financial position. This requires resistance to fan and media pressure
and is not easy."
54. Major League Player Relations Committee Chief Barry Rona, quoted in Bodley,
Baseball's Next Step: Starting It Out, USA Today, Sept. 22, 1987, at Cl, col. 3.
55. See Chass, It's the Great Salary Slowdown: But Is It Collusion Against Free
Agency, Or a Return to Fiscal Sanity?, The Sporting News, Feb. 9, 1987, at 32-33.
56. See supra Bodley, note 54. Many observers accuse the owners of collusion since
the winter of 1986 due to the lack of free agent movement. As Richard Moss, a players'
lawyer, stated, "[w]hat they're [the team owners] trying to do ... is destroy free agency
so they can artificially lower salaries. They want to scare off free agents and make the
players think they're going to destroy their careers if they become free agents. It has
nothing to do with restraint or fiscal responsibility, as they say. It has to do with destroying
the system so they can get back to previous times, perhaps the 1960s." Richard Moss,
quoted in Chass, supra note 55, at 33, col. 2.
57. Chass, Players Are Expected to Benefit as Result of Collusion Ruling, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
58. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. The Twenty-Six Major League Baseball
Clubs, Major League Baseball Association Panel, Grievance No. 86-2 (Sept. 21, 1987)
(Roberts, Arb.).
59. Excerpts From the Ruling, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at A32, col. 1.
60. Id. Note how closely MacPhail's language parallels Peters' description of "The
Law of Increasing Desperation." See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Specifically,
Roberts held that "[tihe Clubs violated Article XVIII(H) of the Basic Agreement following
the completion of the 1985 championship season by acting in concert with regard to the
free agency provisions of the said Article XVIII." Article XVIII establishes professional
baseball's system of free agency, and paragraph H thereof prohibits concerted action
between two or more Clubs or between two or more players when exercising rights
guaranteed in Article XVIII. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. The Twenty-Six
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Arbitrator Roberts' decision is a victory for the players in their fight
for additional control of professional baseball. For nine years, players.
enjoyed a relatively free market with accompanying escalating salaries.
Then, in 1985, baseball owners, according to Roberts, acted in concert
to restrict that freedom. A crucial question remains: Can a remedy be
fashioned making club owners bid for the services of a free agent?6
Clearly, baseball teams will jealously guard the right to "build the team
through the farm system" instead of the free agent market. 2 Therefore,
aside from monetary damages and a "moral victory,"63 it is questionable
if any remedy can materially alter the owners' posture compelling them
to bid on free agent players. Team owners and players are destined to
wrestle over player movement as the effectiveness of any remedy is
tested.
V. SALARY ARBITRATION
"Our attitude toward the arbitration process and its overall effects
on our salary structure remains firm: it is absolutely devastating to us."
-Joe McDonald, General Manager, St. Louis Cardinals"
Major League Baseball Clubs, Major League Baseball Arbitration Panel, Grievance No.
86-2 (Sept. 21, 1987) (Roberts, Arb.).
61. Bodley, Arbitrator Ready to Find Collusion Cure, USA Today, Sept. 23, 1987,
at Cl, col. 3.
Though Roberts ordered owners to cut out the monkey business.... both sides
must agree to a remedy. That will not be easy. In fact, we could end up with
another drawn-out hearing all over again. In the meantime, the owners' behavior
will be monitored clearly.
If, as Player Relations Committee executive director Barry Rona insists, the
owners are committed to financial responsibility, restraint or whatever, they are
not going to change the way they run their businesses.
"Nobody is going to tell me to go out and sign a free agent and nobody is
going to tell me not to sign a free agent," said New York Yankees owner George
Steinbrenner, one of the biggest spenders for free agents before 1985-1986.
Like it or not, the owners have made their point. It has been too dramatic,
too drastic, but they have reduced the number of franchises losing money. At least
half the teams will make money and perhaps as few as four will lose money.
Id.
Bodley concludes his article by observing that players and owners are becoming
increasingly adversarial, and the owners' current practice of free agent restraint is only
promoting "the bitterness between the two sides...." He warns that "[u]nless there is a
drastic change in the adversarial relationship between the two sides, there will be a strike"
after the 1989 season, when the current collective bargaining agreement expires. Id.
62. See Goodwin, Both Ballplayers and Owners Await Forthcoming Remedies, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at A23, col. 4.
63. Pittsburgh Pirates Malcom Prine stated, "We are obviously disappointed with Mr.
Roberts' decision, but we will continue to build the Pirates through the farm system and
trades. The re-entry [free agent] system will not play a significant role." Malcom Prine,
quoted in Bodley, supra. note 54.
64. Quoted in Grebey, Another Look at Baseball's Salary Arbitration, 38 ARB. J.
24, 25 (Dec. 1983).
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Although the Supreme Court held that baseball is exempt from the
requirements of the antitrust laws,65 it is still subject to the requirements
of the National Labor Relations Act.6' Therefore, the League and the
Player's Union are obligated to bargain, and one topic for discussion is
salaries. Under the old reserve clause system, management made the
player an offer which the player was "free" to accept or reject. If the
offer was rejected, the only way to pressure the owners into offering a
better deal was to "hold out"; that is, stay away from training camp,
and perhaps the first games of the season. If the player was valuable
enough to the team, then the owner might increase the offer. If he was
not so valuable, "[the player's] only alternative to accepting his club's
final salary offer was retirement from baseball."'
Arbitration was endorsed by some baseball officials as early as 1952,
when then-Commissioner A. B. "Happy" Chandler endorsed the use of
binding salary arbitration "because of the inferior bargaining position
of the player who may negotiate with only one employer."" The owners,
however, preferred the existing reserve clause system; they had absolute
authority to determine the amount of the last offer made. Under binding
arbitration, they feared that the arbitrator might award an amount
greater than their offer, thus depriving them of the power to control
their own payroll.
Baseball's arbitration process is based on the "last best offer" prin-
ciple. Under this system, the parties bargain to impasse on the topic
of salary. Once it is determined that continued negotiations would be
fruitless, both management and player submit one proposed salary figure
to the arbitrator. The arbitrator then holds hearings, allotting one and
one half hours for each side to present their evidence. The arbitrator
must choose one figure or the other, either the player's or management's,
and award the player that salary for the next season. There is no opinion
issued with the arbitrator's decision, and the decision must be made in
twenty-four hours.69 This process, in contrast to pre-arbitration "nego-
tiations", is a no-lose situation for the player. He either receives the
figure offered by the team (the figure he would have been forced to
accept before arbitration) or the higher figure he submits. In exchange,
owners generally avoid "hold outs" and have a complete team in training
camp each spring.
65. See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
66. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1984)).
67. Note, Arbitration of Grievance and Salary Disputes in Professional Baseball:
Evolution of a System of Private Law, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1049, 1056-66 (1974-1975).
68. Id. at 1065.
69. See Grebey, supra note 64, at 24-30.
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The practical effect of this system is that both sides have incentive
to keep the figures they submit within reason. If one proposal is too
extreme, the other wins almost by default.
The criteria on which the arbitrator bases the decision are as follows:
(1) the quality of the player's contribution to his club during the past
season (including performance, leadership, and public appeal); (2) length
and consistence of a player's career performance; (3) the player's past
compensation; (4) comparative baseball salaries; (5) the existence of
physical or mental defects affecting performance; and (6) the club's
recent performance."
Topics specifically excluded .from discussion are the following: (1)
the financial position of the player and the club; (2) press comments,
testimonials, or similar material bearing on the performance of either
the player or the club, except that recognized player awards for playing
excellence shall not be excluded; (3) offers made by either player or
club prior to arbitration; (4) the cost to the parties of their representatives,
attorneys, etc.; and (5) salaries in other sports or occupations.7'
In 1986, arbitrators heard twenty-six salary arbitrations, but eighty-
three were decided between the parties before the case went to arbi-
tration. Of those that went to arbitration, management won sixteen, and
the players won ten.72
A cursory glance at the salary figures reveal that salary arbitration
is an effective dispute settlement method, even though only a small
number of cases are actually completed in arbitration. The last best
offer method of decision encourages both parties to submit reasonable
figures. In fact, one player, Atlanta pitcher David Palmer, after deciding
to have his salary determined through arbitration after negotiations
failed, discovered the figures he and management submitted were iden-
tical." More often, the player and management submit salary figures
that are reasonably similiar, and they settle prior to the actual arbitration
on a salary somewhere between the two.
Most importantly, the system provides a means by which the players
themselves have a voice in determining what their salaries will be. Andy
Messersmith, baseball's first real free agent said this about his free
agency fight: "It was less of an economic issue at the time than a fight
for the right to have some control over your own destiny.... It was
just a matter of being tired of going in to negotiate a new contract and
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id.
72. The following is a chart of all the major league players who filed for salary
arbitration in the winter of 1986-1987 and the eventual outcome: (all figures in thousands
of dollars)
73. See supra note 64.
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hearing the owners say, 'OK, here's what you're going to get. Tough
luck."'7 4 Arbitration, as it is practiced today, allows players an opportunity
to effectively bargain with management to an unprecedented degree.
Although arbitration provides players with a stronger voice in deter-
mining their own salaries, and free agency allows for freer movement
between teams, these two avenues of player participation do have short-
comings. One major effect results from the interplay of free agency
and arbitration. Free agency features competitive bidding between clubs
Player/TEAM
BALTIMORE
M. Boddicker, p
R. Bordi, p
B. Havens, p
J. Shelby, of
BOSTON
M. Barrett, 2b
W. Boggs, 3b
D. Boyd, p
B. Hurst, p
S. Owen, ss
CALIFORNIA
G. Pettis, of
D. Schofield, ss
1986 Player Club 1987 Salary
Salary Demand Offer Award Settlement
$ 812
235
90
225
435
1,350
375
495
240
300 550 400 400
210 475 305 475
565
1,600
550
700
305
CHICAGO WHITE SOX
B. James, p
CLEVELAND
C. Bando, c
B. Butler, of
C. Castillo, of
J. Franco, ss
M. Hall, of
B. Jacoby, 3b
P. Niekro, p
K. Schrom, p
P. Tabler, lb
T. Waddell, p
DETROIT
J. Grubb, of
J. Morris, p
P. Sheridan, of
KANSAS CITY
B. Black, p
M. Gubicza, p
C. Liebrandt, p
555 575 455 - 470
425 275 -
1,850 1,350 1,850
230 150 -
MILWAUKEE
None
74. Macnow, supra note 6, at 33.
305
247.5
775
550
612.5
500
580
250
365
190
600
450
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MINNESOTA
K. Atherton, p
G. Gaetti, 3b
T. Laudner, c
M. Smithson, p
F. Viola, p
NEW YORK YANKEES
C. Guante, p
C. Hudson, p
R. Kittle, of
D. Mattingly, lb
OAKLAND
C. Codiroli, p
M. Davis, of
J. Howell, p
G. Nelson, p
T. Phillips, if
SEATTLE
P. Bradley, of
A. Davis, lb
B. Kearney, c
P. Ladd, p
M. Langston, p
M. Moore, p
M. Morgan, p
E. Nunez, p
K. Phelps, lb
D. Ramos, if
TEXAS
G. Harris, p
M. Mason, p
TORONTO
J. Barfield, of
G. Bell, of
C. McMurtry, p
ATLANTA
J. Acker, p
J. Dedmon, p
T. Harper, of
D. Palmer, p
D. Motley, of
CHICAGO CUBS
None
CINCINNATI
N. Esasky, if
T. Power, p
M. Venable, of
HOUSTON
K. Bass, of
B. Doran, 2b
D. Walling, 3b
137
515
155
450
674
307.5
265
400
1,375
270
600
530
205
250
475
400
300
100
188
400
65
250
200
85
310
195
369
975
285
625
900
455
350
450
1,975
325
850
630
400
500
750
535
335
275
420
575
225
287.5
515
100
380
265
400
1,700
250
700
530
300
405
550
450
285
160
342.5
440
150
200
300
70
1,975
530
750
620 575 620
325 260 -
650 1,350
650 1,325
225.5 Withdrew
325
200
425
335
257.5
1,125
1.000
- 1,237.5
- 1,117.5
210
450
338
475
725
257.5
272.5
500
225
310
550
366.667
272.5 -
500 500
210 -
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for the services of players. Competitive bidding, when combined with
the "Law of Increasing Desperation," played a large part in the rapid
rise in player salaries during the first nine years of free agency. Obviously,
when management completely controlled the salary process and con-
trolled player movement free market pressures were almost non-existent,
and salaries, as a result, remained artificially low.
It would, however, be a mistake to attribute the rise in salaries solely
to free agency and the end of management control. 7 Salary arbitration
LOS ANGELES
D. Anderson, ss 200 250 200 - 225
0. Hershiser, p 1,000 1,100 800 800 -
M. Marshall, of 650 695 650 - 670
A. Pena, p 350 367.5 280 280 -
M. Young, p 205 390 325 - 350
MONTREAL
A. McGaffigan, p 180 350 250 - 292.5
NEW YORK METS
W. Backman, 2b 325 600 500 - 550
R. Darling, p 440 1,050 800 1,050 -
D. Gooden, p 1,320 1,800 1,320 - 1,500
H. Johnson, if 227.5 320 265 - 297.5
K. McReynolds, of 275 825 625 625 -
D. Sisk, p 275 368 300 - 330
T. Teufel, 2b 200 315 240 - 277.5
PHILADELPHIA
K. Gross, p 350 530 420 420 -
G. Redus, of 350 440 350 - 400
J. Samuel, 2b 487.5 775 615 - 540
PITTSBURGH
M. Brown, of 225 260 200 - 212.5
ST. LOUIS
D. Cox, p 380 875 600 600 -
B. Forsch, p 527.235 775 700 - 750
W. McGee, of 500 850 650 - 700
SAN DIEGO
D. Dravecky, p 350 615 475 - 575
A. Hawkins, p 300 535 450 535 -
C. Lefferts, p 390 520 450 - 500
M. Wynne, of 205 275 220 - 240
SAN FRANCISCO
C. Davis, of 690 840 775 - 815
M. Davis, p 350 460 385 - 415
C. Maldonado, of 170 440 390 - 415
E. Milner, of 350 525 450 - 490
USA Today, Feb. 23, 1987, at C8, col. 1.
75. Miller, Arbitration of Baseball Salaries: Impartial Adjudication in Place of
Management Fiat, 38 ARB. J. 31, 33 (Dec. 1983) ("The increase (in salaries) demonstrates
the unconscionable exploitation of players in earlier years.").
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combined with free agency status artificially inflates salaries. Recall
that one criterion for arbitrators is "comparative baseball salaries."
These comparative salaries include those determined through free agency
bidding, even though the circumstances surrounding an offered salary
are far different from those incident to the actual awarding through
arbitration.
It would be logical to assume that a team interested in a free agent
is in search of a player to fill a certain, specific need that cannot be
filled with existing players within the organization. Management is
speculating that the free agent will be able to fill that perceived need.
Factors affecting an offer are the probability that the player will perform
at a certain expected level and the player's ability to draw fans to the
stadium. Unlike salaries determined through the arbitration process,
which considers past contributions to the team, free agency offers are
based soley on what the interested team hopes the player will provide
in the following season. Arbitration figures, then, operate as a reward
for past excellence, while free agent salaries can be viewed as lures,
buoyed by competitive bidding and the perceived urgency of the team's
need.
76
As in any type of speculative venture, some free agents do not
perform to the expectations of the team that signed them. In such a
case, the "underachieving" agent has, from management's viewpoint,
been overpaid, yet the player still earns the contracted sum. Of course,
such a high-salary, low-performance combination is not limited to free
agents, but free agents have the distinction of a salary determined more
by free market forces and perhaps inflated bidding than non-agent
players. The opportunity, then, for a large pay-performance disparity is
generally greater for free agents than with other players.
This pay-performance disparity, while unpleasant to team owners,
also affects other team owners. Future arbitration decisions, based in
part on competitive salaries, will base decisions on these free agents'
salaries. A player participating in arbitration can base his claim in part
on the salary given a free agent by another team.
The result is a salary spiral that was unthinkable in 1975. Salaries
76. A player's recent performance is, of course, a large factor in determining the offer
made in free agent bidding. Yet it is a factor only in the sense that it leads an interested
team to believe that the agent will have another similarly productive season. No consid-
eration is offered the free agent as a reward for past performance. He will be paid only
on the basis of what his contribution is expected to be next season. To a certain extent,
this is also true in arbitration. The salary to be determined is the player's salary for the
upcoming season, not the previous season. However, a review of the criteria used to
determine a salary in arbitration shows that an arbitrator's decision is based largely on
what the player accomplished and what other players with similar ability earned. What
management believes the player will be worth in the future is specifically excluded from
the arbitrator's consideration. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
rise during free agent bidding, and the general level of all players'
salaries rises with the agent's salaries. Through arbitration and other
salary negotiations between management and players, these salaries
become part of the game's structure. Player participation in the salary
determination process, then, may have had the unforeseen effect not
only to remove the process from management's total control, but also
of artificially stimulating salary levels by allowing "speculation" salaries
to be integrated into the overall salary structure.
Some additional problems with arbitration and free agency resulting
from management's desire to slow the rise of player's salaries can best
be illustrated by examining the following three case studies.
A. Jack Morris
Morris is the most successful pitcher of the 1980's, compiling a 123-
81 record since 1980 with the Detroit Tigers.' After the 1986 season,
he announced his intention to try his luck on the free agent market.
On December 16, 1986, he met with representatives of the Minnesota
Twins and tendered offers based on the salaries of other successful
major league pitchers. Morris offered to sign a contract and have the
salary determined through the arbitration process. The offer was refused
one day later.78
Two days after this rejection, Morris made a similar offer to the
New York Yankees.79 Despite Morris' marketability, the Yankee owners
stalled and declined to make Morris an offer.'
On December 20, 1986, Morris re-signed with his former team,
agreeing to have his salary determined by an arbitrator.8' The primary
reason for his return was simply that no other team would agree to
sign him, even at a price determined by an arbitrator. There was no
free agent frenzy marked by unrestrained bidding. Although the salary
arbitration process gives a player a role in determining his salary, it
does not ensure a contract with the team of his choice. Morris simply
returned to his former team and won the largest arbitration award up
to that time.82
B. Lance Parrish
Lance Parrish decided he would not return to his team, the Tigers,
and rejected an offer of arbitration and a million dollar annual salary.
77. Chass, Twins Reject Morris Demand, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1986, at D23, col.
2.
78. Id.
79. Chass, Morris Makes His Offers and Steinbrenner Listens, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,
1986, at B5, col. 4.
80. Chass, Morris Returns to Tigers After Rejection by Yankees, N.Y. Times, Dec.
20, 1986, at 51, col. 4.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 64.
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He reportedly was seeking a one million dollar contract on the free
agent market. 3 Parrish negotiated with the Philadelphia Phillies for
almost three months before signing a contract that provided for only
$800,000 with possible performance bonuses amounting to $450,000."
In all probability, this contract compensated him less than he would
have made had he signed with his former employer.
C. Roger Clemens
Roger Clemens received both the American League's Cy Young
Award (awarded annually to the best pitcher) and the Most Valuable
Player Award in 1986 for his role in leading the Boston Red Sox to
the American League pennant. However, because of the short length
of time he has been in the League, he is ineligible for free agency or
salary arbitration. On March 8, 1987, he left spring training camp
because he had not yet signed a contract." In 1986, Clemens was paid
$340,000, with an option to increase that salary to $500,000 plus
incentives amounting to $850,000. Clemens, however, wanted $2.4 million
for two years. Since Clemens did not accept this option, the Red Sox
renewed his old contract, as is their right under the reserve clause
system. The team also levied a $1,000 per day fine for missing training
camp. Clemens responded that for every $1,000 fine against him, he
would increase his salary demand by $1,500.6 The two sides finally
resolved their differences. 7
The Clemens situation illustrates the nature of contract negotiations
prior to the salary arbitration system. Players dissatisfied with their
contract offer had no recourse but to leave training camp and hope
their absence would be felt. Under the current system, this problem
has been eliminated in almost all cases.
These three examples demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages
of present methods of dispute resolution used in major league baseball.
The Clemens case demonstrates the problems that resulted before the
arbitration system; spring training hold-outs and acrimonious relationships
between players and owners. The system failed Clemens only because
he had not been in the major leagues long enough to qualify for
arbitration. The Parrish and Morris examples cast the free agent market
in a restrained, somewhat collusive light, with interested teams making
equitable offers and rejections to players, and with the players retaining
the right to accept or reject. In all three of the cases, the owners
83. See Baseball Notebook - Tigers, The Sporting News, Jan. 5, 1987, at 58, col. 3.
84. The Columbus Dispatch (Associated Press), Mar. 13, 1987, at BI, col. 1.
85. Id., Mar. 8, 1987, at El, col. 4.
86. Id., Mar. 12, 1987, at B4, col. 1.
87. Clemens rejoined the Red Sox in May and distinguished himself by winning his
second consecutive Cy Young Award.
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decided not to "go overboard" and participate in a bidding war against
one another. No offers were made to any of 1986's free agents that
were higher than the salaries currently being paid to other professional
baseball players. Owners view this a return to fiscal sanity. Players view
this collusion violative of trade.
V1 CONCLUSION
If there is an agreement between owners not to sign additional high-
priced free agents, then perhaps baseball has come full cycle and returned
to the days of "Orator Jim" O'Rourke and the secret reserve system.
If this has occured, then the game could be on the verge of a new
player-management relationship. Arbitration and free agency opened the
game to more player control, resulting in skyrocketing salaries. Man-
agement, reacting in an effort to slow this rise, discouraged competition
in free agent biddings. Yet the arbitration system is still intact, and
players continue to move between teams via free agency. Players have
more control over their salaries than in the past, and their salaries have
benefitted.
A dilemma remains. What type of remedy can be fashioned and
enforced compelling owners to bid for free agents in a manner acceptable
to the agents? Unless such a remedy is devised, forcing active man-
agement participation in the free agent market, player attempts at
gaining more control and higher salaries through free agency may meet
with a difficult obstacle-owner inaction. If permitted to remain inactive,
baseball owners will have thrown the players an unhittable pitch.
Kevin A. Rings
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